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CLARITY AND CONFUSION:
DID REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA V. ALTMANN
REVIVE STATE DEPARTMENT SUGGESTIONS
OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY?
MARK J. CHORAZAK
INTRODUCTION
For Maria Altmann, a Holocaust survivor in her late eighties,
1938 is not just a year. It marked the beginning of the “Anschluss,”
the Nazi invasion and annexation of her native Austria, and her
family’s subsequent flight from Vienna.1 More than sixty years later,
following a discovery by a journalist conducting research in the state
archives at the Austrian Gallery,2 Altmann learned that six Gustav
Klimt paintings that she thought had been donated to the Gallery by
her uncle had actually been confiscated from him by the Nazis and
transferred to the Gallery under a cover letter signed “Heil Hitler.”3
After the Republic of Austria rejected her proposals for private
arbitration, and after litigating in Austrian courts proved overly
burdensome, Altmann brought suit against Austria in a Los Angeles
4
federal district court. Austria moved to dismiss the suit, claiming that
it was entitled to sovereign immunity because the alleged conduct
occurred before the United States codified its policy of restrictive

Copyright © 2005 by Mark J. Chorazak.
1. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 681–82 (2004).
2. Id. at 684. The Austrian federal minister opened the Gallery’s archives to the journalist,
Hubertus Czernin, along with other researchers, following a controversy surrounding two
paintings by Egon Schiele. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1195 (C.D.
Cal. 2001). See generally United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99 Civ. 9940, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6445 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2002) (discussing the controversy surrounding the Schiele
paintings). The Schiele controversy, which has generated protracted litigation, “has created a
bombshell in the art world.” MICHAEL J. BAZYLER, HOLOCAUST JUSTICE: THE BATTLE FOR
RESTITUTION IN AMERICA’S COURTS 226 (2003).
3. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 684.
4. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1196 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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immunity in 1976 and even before it adopted the policy in 1952. In
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, the Supreme Court disagreed and
allowed Altmann’s claim to proceed.6
Altmann’s case is one of many brought by private plaintiffs
seeking redress in American courts against foreign states.7 The
8
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), which provides
the “sole basis” for bringing suit against a foreign state in an
American court,9 enumerates several exceptions to foreign states’
traditionally recognized immunity as sovereigns. The question before
the Court in Altmann was whether the FSIA should apply
retroactively to conduct that occurred before the United States
articulated its policy of restrictive sovereign immunity, by which
immunity is limited to those suits involving a foreign sovereign’s
public, not private or commercial, acts.10 Several governments,
11
12
13
including the United States, Mexico, and Japan, filed amicus briefs
warning that retroactive applicability would threaten foreign states’
reasonable and settled expectations of immunity from suit for pre1952 conduct. The Court concluded, however, that the doctrine of

5. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 686. Austria raised additional defenses, including improper venue
and dismissal under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, but these were rejected by the Ninth
Circuit and not considered in the Supreme Court’s opinion, see id. at 686 n.6 (noting that
Austria raised these defenses); thus, they will not be discussed further in this Note.
6. Id. at 700.
7. See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 241 (2d Cir.
1996), recalled and remanded, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2338 (2d Cir. Feb. 10, 1997), cert. denied
520 U.S. 1204 (1997) (suit against Libya for sponsoring terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103);
Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16, 19 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated and remanded, 72
Fed. Appx. 850 (2d Cir. 2003) (suit by Polish Jews against a Polish government agency for post–
World War II expropriations); Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 175 F.
Supp. 2d 423, 423 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), aff’d 389 F.3d 61 (2004), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1841 (2005)
(suit against a French national railroad for actions taken in transporting Jews to death camps
during the Holocaust); Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2001), aff’d 332 F.3d 679
(D.C. Cir. 2003), reaff’d 413 F.3d 45 (2005) (suit by Asian women against Japan for damages
from alleged sexual slavery and torture by Japanese military). Both Abrams and Joo were
reconsidered in light of Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004).
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330–32, 1441, 1602–11 (2005).
9. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989).
10. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 692.
11. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10, Altmann, 541
U.S. 677 (No. 03-13), 2003 WL 22811828, at *10.
12. Brief for Mexico as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 3, Altmann, 541 U.S. 677
(No. 03-13), 2003 WL 22766741, at *3.
13. Brief for Japan as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 7, Altmann, 541 U.S. 677
(No. 03-13), 2003 WL 22753584, at *7.
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foreign sovereign immunity “reflects current political realities and
relationships” and that retroactivity is consistent with the dual
purposes of the FSIA: to “clarify[] the rules that judges should apply
in resolving sovereign immunity claims and eliminate[] political
14
participation in the resolution of such claims.” The Court also
indicated that the State Department, in FSIA cases, could once again
file “suggestions of immunity,” which are recommendations that a
federal court dismiss a suit against a foreign state for lack of
jurisdiction.15
This Note argues that although the Court in Altmann provided
lower courts with much-needed clarity in holding that the FSIA is
permissibly retroactive, it erred in inviting the State Department to
once again file suggestions of immunity. Most importantly, this Note
contributes to the literature by arguing that, although applying the
FSIA retroactively may bring hope to those plaintiffs who have
“nowhere else to go” and headaches to the State Department because
it resurrects suggestions of immunity, Altmann is unlikely either to
dramatically expose foreign states to viable suits or to lead to the dire
consequences that have been predicted for the United States’ conduct
of its foreign relations.16
Part I of this Note offers a review of the central tenets of
sovereign immunity, from its common law roots to its current
statutory construction. Part II briefly reviews the patchwork of
conflicting interpretations of the FSIA within the case law before
introducing Altmann. Part III analyzes how Altmann’s reinforcement
of the FSIA as a jurisdictional statute resolves the split that was
emerging within the circuits by neither violating the legal principles of
retroactivity nor contravening the spirit of restrictive sovereign
immunity. Finally, Part IV explores Altmann’s implications for
plaintiffs, foreign states, and the State Department before concluding
that the Court should clarify when courts should defer to State
Department suggestions of immunity.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The United States’ approach to sovereign immunity can be
traced by looking at three periods: first, the Nation’s founding era,

14.
15.
16.

Altmann, 541 U.S. at 696, 699.
Id. at 701.
See infra Part III.B.
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when foreign states enjoyed “absolute” immunity from suit; second,
between 1952 and 1976, when the “Tate Letter” set forth a more
“restrictive” policy of sovereign immunity; and third, since 1976,
when the FSIA was enacted to codify the doctrine of restrictive
immunity.
A. From Absolute to Restrictive Sovereignty Immunity
The United States’ initial policy of according foreign states
absolute immunity from suit has its roots in The Schooner Exchange
17
v. M’Faddon. In 1812, Chief Justice Marshall noted that the
jurisdiction of the United States within its own territory “is
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.” As a matter of
comity and the need to maintain diplomatic relations, however,
members of the international community had implicitly agreed to
waive the exercise of jurisdiction over other sovereigns in certain
classes of cases, such as those involving foreign ministers or the
person of the sovereign, who, Marshall observed, were immune from
suit when acting “with the knowledge and license of [their]
sovereign.”18 Thus, courts almost automatically dismissed suits against
foreign states under the doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity.19
In 1952, the United States departed from its practice of granting
absolute sovereign immunity, granting instead only limited
immunity.20 The shift was motivated, in large measure, by acceptance
in the international community of what has become known as the
“restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity; the emerging role of
nation-states as participants in commercial affairs; and the fact that

17. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
18. Id. at 136, 137; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)
(“For more than a century and a half, the United States generally granted foreign sovereigns
complete immunity from suit in the courts of this country.”).
19. Dismissal was especially common in sensitive cases, such as those involving friendly
nations. See Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 587–88 (1943) (noting that claims against
friendly foreign states are “normally presented and settled in the course of the conduct of
foreign affairs by the President and the Department of State” and that “[i]n such cases the
judicial department of [the] government follows the action of the political branch, and will not
embarrass the latter by assuming an antagonistic jurisdiction”). The State Department would
file a suggestion of immunity with a federal court and the court would, in turn, dismiss the suit, a
procedure that lasted for the next 165 years after The Schooner Exchange. Enahoro v.
Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 880 (7th Cir. 2005).
20. Letter from Acting Legal Adviser Jack B. Tate to Acting Attorney General Philip B.
Perlman (May 19, 1962), reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711–
15 (1976).
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the United States had already subjected itself to suits in foreign courts
21
in tort, contract, and merchant vessel disputes. In a letter to Acting
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman by Acting Legal Adviser to the
Secretary of State Jack B. Tate, the State Department observed that
there was broadening support within the international community for
extending immunity to foreign states only for their sovereign or
public acts—jure imperii—and not for their commercial or private
acts—jure gestionis.22 The “Tate Letter,”23 as it is known, expressly
adopted this “restrictive theory” of sovereign immunity and noted
that it “[would] be the [State] Department’s practice to advise [the
Justice Department] of all requests by foreign governments for the
grant of immunity from suit and of the Department’s [opinion].”24
Such an approach for determining whether a foreign state was
immune from suit seemed straightforward. In application, however, it
proved problematic.25
B. From Case-by-Case Political Pressures to Apolitical
Determinations under the FSIA
The weaknesses of restrictive immunity under the Tate Letter
were twofold. First, it failed to empower courts to make immunity
determinations because “[a]s in the past, initial responsibility for
deciding questions of sovereign immunity fell primarily upon the
Executive acting through the State Department,” which continued
issuing suggestions of immunity to courts.26 Worse still, foreign states,
no longer afforded absolute immunity from suit, began placing
diplomatic pressure on the State Department to file favorable
suggestions with courts.27 The result was that political considerations
sometimes influenced the State Department to intervene “in cases

21. Alfred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 714 (citing the Tate Letter for the proposition that other
nation-states “adhering to the [restrictive] theory” was “most persuasive” in convincing the
United States to change its policy, and also noting the “widespread and increasing practice on
the part of governments [to engage] in commercial activities”).
22. Id. at 711.
23. Id. at 698.
24. Id. at 714–15.
25. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (explaining
how application of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity “proved troublesome” because
“foreign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the State Department in seeking
immunity”).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive
28
theory.” Second, the Tate Letter failed to provide any clear standard
for courts to follow in making immunity determinations when foreign
29
states did not request immunity from the State Department. Instead,
courts had only prior State Department decisions to guide them, and
these decisions had applied the restrictive theory inconsistently.30 The
practical effect of these problems was troubling—questions as to a
foreign state’s sovereign immunity were being determined by two
different branches and without a clear standard of when immunity
31
should be recognized.
In 1976, Congress codified the restrictive theory of sovereign
32
immunity in the FSIA. Although adopting the general rule that
foreign states are immune from jurisdiction in the federal courts, the
FSIA delineates exceptions under which a suit may be brought
against a foreign state or one of its agencies or instrumentalities.33
These exceptions include when a foreign state (1) has waived its
immunity either explicitly or by implication, (2) acts in a commercial
capacity, (3) expropriates property in violation of international law
and in some commercial capacity affecting the United States, (4) is
involved in a matter in which rights in real estate acquired by
inheritance or gift are at issue, (5) is a party to a personal or property
injury action occurring in the United States, (6) has consented to
arbitration, (7) is involved in a personal injury action arising from
terrorist acts the state has sponsored in the United States, or (8) is
subject to suit in admiralty for enforcement of a maritime lien based
upon the foreign state’s commercial activity.34 Put simply, if a claim
does not fall within one of these exceptions, a federal court must
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the foreign state.
In enacting the FSIA, Congress envisaged that its
“comprehensive set of legal standards” would accomplish the
following objectives: free the State Department from “case-by-case
diplomatic pressures”; clarify for courts the standards to apply in
making immunity determinations; and assure litigants that, by placing

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id. at 487–88.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 488.
Id.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(7), (b) (2000).
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primary responsibility with the judiciary and not the executive,
immunity determinations would be made on legal, rather than
35
political, grounds. Lower courts have differed, however, as to
whether Congress, in codifying the restrictive theory in the FSIA,
intended it to apply to acts occurring prior to 1952, when the
restrictive theory was adopted.
Until the Supreme Court decided Altmann, there was a
patchwork of conflicting opinions within the lower courts. For
example, district courts in Illinois36 and California37 held that the FSIA
did apply retroactively, whereas a district court in the District of
Columbia38 ruled that it did not. And among the courts of appeal, the
Ninth Circuit’s view, that it is permissible to apply the FSIA to pre39
40
1952 conduct, clearly differed from the Eleventh and D.C. Circuits’
position that the FSIA should not be so applied. The Second Circuit
simply endorsed an approach of having district courts broadly seek
“case-by-case recommendations” by the State Department,41 thereby
encouraging a return to the sort of analysis employed before the
FSIA was enacted. The Court sought to resolve these differences by
granting certiorari in Altmann.42
II. THE ALTMANN CASE
Altmann is one of the most important recent decisions in
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Essentially, Altmann attempts to
resolve the question of whether a suit, involving a unique and
historically significant set of facts arising in the twentieth century,
may be brought in the twenty-first century against a foreign state in a
federal court.

35. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606).
36. Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland), 68 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946 (N.D. Ill.
1999).
37. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
38. Yin v. Government of Japan, No. 92-2574, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6061, at *6 (D.D.C.
May 6, 1994).
39. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2002).
40. Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Jackson v. People’s Republic of China,
794 F.2d 1490, 1497–98 (11th Cir. 1986).
41. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 72 F. App’x 850, 854 (2d Cir. 2003).
42. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 539 U.S. 987, 987 (2003).
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A. Bringing Suit against Austria
Maria Altmann’s uncle, Ferdinand Bloch-Bauer, was a wealthy
43
sugar magnate and prominent patron of the arts. Bloch-Bauer fled
Austria after it was annexed by the Nazis in 1938. His sugar company
was “Aryanized.”44 His palatial Vienna home was taken over and his
45
vast art and porcelain collections were confiscated.
Before the war, Bloch-Bauer and his wife, Adele, were friends of
46
the famous painter Gustav Klimt. Adele was a subject of two of the
six Klimt paintings that Bloch-Bauer owned.47 Considered important
symbols of Austrian culture,48 the six paintings are valued at
49
approximately $150 million. All but one of these paintings have been
hanging in the Austrian National Gallery for over fifty years.50
51
Altmann is her uncle’s sole surviving heir. Although her aunt,
Adele, who died in 1925, executed a will “ask[ing]” that her husband
bequeath five of the six paintings at issue to the Austrian National
52
Gallery after his death, he never did so. Bloch-Bauer died soon after
the war ended in 1945, the same year that Altmann became an
American citizen.53 In his will, Bloch-Bauer left his entire estate to
54
Altmann and her two siblings.
In 1946, Austria invalidated all Aryanizations of property, but
required exiled Austrians to seek “export permits” of “artworks . . .
55
deemed to be important to [Austria’s] cultural heritage.” These
permits, however, were often used by the Austrian government to
“forc[e] Jews to donate or trade valuable artworks to the [Gallery] in

43. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 680–81 (2004).
44. Id. at 682. “Aryanization” refers to the process by which “Jews were forced to sell their
property to ‘Aryans’ at artificially low prices.” United States v. Portrait of Wally, No. 99-9940,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6445, *3–*4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2002) (internal citation omitted); RAUL
HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 95 (1961).
45. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 682.
46. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 240–41.
47. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 681.
48. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 241.
49. Id. at 240–41.
50. Id.
51. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 681.
52. Id. at 681–82.
53. Id. at 681.
54. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 241.
55. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 682–83.
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56
exchange for export permits for other works.” The following year,
Altmann and her fellow heirs hired a Viennese lawyer to recover
property stolen from their uncle during the war.57 In exchange for
signing a document “acknowledg[ing] and accept[ing]” the validity of
Austria’s claim to the Klimt paintings, the heirs’ lawyer secured an
export permit for most of the remainder of Bloch-Bauer’s collection.58
Altmann, however, was never aware of this arrangement and, until
1998, thought that her aunt and uncle had “freely donated” the Klimt
paintings to the Gallery.59
In 1998, a journalist conducting research in the Austrian
Gallery’s archives discovered documents showing that the Gallery
had known that neither Bloch-Bauer nor his wife had donated the
paintings to the Gallery.60 The journalist also found that one of the
most famous paintings in the collection, Adele Bloch-Bauer I, had
repeatedly been referenced in Gallery publications as having been
donated by Altmann’s uncle in 1936 when it had actually been
transferred to the Gallery by the Nazis.61
Once these findings were made public, Austria enacted a new
law to return artworks that had been coercively donated to state
museums.62 Under this law, Altmann successfully recovered several
Klimt drawings and porcelain settings that had been donated after the
war.63 Altmann failed to recover, however, the six Klimt paintings,
which Austria claimed had been properly donated under Adele’s
64
will. After Austria declined Altmann’s request for private
arbitration, she brought suit in Austria.65 Because pursuing the suit in
66
Austria would have been prohibitively expensive, Altmann instead

56. Id. at 683.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 684.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 244–45.
66. Under Austrian law, plaintiffs are required to deposit a filing fee proportional to the
value sought; Altmann’s request for a waiver of the almost two million dollar fee was denied. Id.
at 245.
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sought recovery of the paintings in a federal district court in Los
67
Angeles in 2000.
Austria moved to dismiss the case on the ground of absolute
68
sovereign immunity. In 2001, the district court denied Austria’s
motion, holding that the FSIA, which contained an exception to
sovereign immunity for cases involving expropriations, applied to pre1952 events.69 In 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that
Austria could not have reasonably expected to receive immunity for
70
its World War II–era actions. Austria then appealed to the Supreme
Court, which granted certiorari in 2003.71 In January 2006, more than
a year and a half after the Supreme Court’s decision in Altmann, an
Austrian arbitration court ordered Austria to return five Klimt
paintings to Altmann and her family.72
B. Shifting Boundaries: The FSIA Can Be Applied Retroactively
In Altmann, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s
denial of Austria’s motion to dismiss, holding that the FSIA applies to
all claims against foreign sovereigns, “regardless of when the
underlying conduct occurred.”73 Writing for the majority, Justice
Stevens noted that, by requiring courts to apply the FSIA’s sovereign
immunity rules in all cases, the Court’s holding was consistent with
the FSIA’s central purpose—to clarify the rules judges should apply
in immunity determinations and to remove political participation
from the process.74
75
The Court first explained why it expressly disagreed with the
76
Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Landgraf v. USI Film Products. In
Landgraf, the Court set out the general rule that laws conferring
substantive rights or obligations have no retroactive effect absent an

67. Id. at 245.
68. Id. at 246.
69. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
70. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965, 974 (9th Cir. 2002).
71. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 539 U.S. 987 (2003).
72. Diane Haithman & Christopher Reynolds, Court Awards Nazi-Looted Artworks to
L.A. Woman, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2006, at A1.
73. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 697–700 (2004).
74. Id. at 699.
75. Id. at 692 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994)).
76. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
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77
express statutory command. In those cases in which a law contains
no express command, Landgraf requires a court to determine
whether the new law would have an impermissible retroactive effect
78
in practice. The Court did not criticize the Landgraf inquiry into
whether a law affects substantive rights or only matters of procedure,
but instead noted that the inquiry failed to provide a clear answer
79
because the FSIA “defies such categorization.” Even though “the
FSIA is not simply a jurisdictional statute . . . but a codification of ‘the
standards governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of
substantive federal law,”80 the Court held in Altmann that the central
purpose of foreign sovereign immunity is not to allow foreign states
to “shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity
81
from suit.” Instead, sovereign immunity “reflects current political
realities and relationships, and aims to give foreign states and their
instrumentalities some present ‘protection from the inconvenience of
suit as a gesture of comity.’”82
Looking to the FSIA’s language and overall structure, the Court
found an “unambiguous” statement in the preamble that claims
against foreign states were “‘henceforth’ to be decided . . . ‘in
conformity with the principles set forth’” in the FSIA and also found
that many of the other provisions were “unquestionably” meant to
83
apply retroactively. Thus, the Court reasoned that retroactive
application of the FSIA was also consistent with congressional
84
intent.
Finally, the Court stressed the “narrowness” of its holding,
85
noting that several defenses, such as the act-of-state doctrine, would
86
remain available to Austria. Although the Court concluded by
emphasizing that the State Department could still file suggestions of

77. Id. at 280.
78. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 694; Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280.
79. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 694.
80. Id. at 695 (emphasis omitted) (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S.
480, 496–97 (1983)).
81. Id. at 696.
82. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479
(2003)).
83. Id. at 697–98 (quoting 28 U.S.C § 1602 (2000)).
84. Id. at 699.
85. See infra Part IV.B.
86. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700.
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immunity, it expressed no opinion as to whether courts should defer
87
to such statements.
III. CLARITY IN SOME AREAS, CONCERNS IN OTHERS
Following its decision in Altmann, the Supreme Court quickly
granted certiorari in four cases, vacating and remanding them to the
courts of appeal for consideration in light of its holding.88 The Court’s
clarification in Altmann of the scope of the FSIA’s reach will provide
the lower courts with much-needed guidance. Already, the Second
Circuit has applied Altmann in deciding a suit against a French
national railroad company.89
What is striking about Altmann is that it provokes such heated
debate about whether retroactive application of the FSIA is
consistent with the legal principles of retroactivity and the spirit of
sovereign immunity. This Part argues that the holding in Altmann is
wholly consistent with both. Unfortunately, for all its clarity,
Altmann’s reference to the State Department’s ability to file
suggestions of immunity has raised questions as to whether such
involvement by the executive violates separation-of-power principles
and contravenes one of the primary purposes of the FSIA—to
remove political considerations from the immunity calculus.
A. Altmann Resolves Interpretative Tensions between Retroactivity
Principles and the Purpose of Sovereign Immunity
At the heart of American law is a presumption against applying
statutes retroactively. As the Court stated in INS v. St. Cyr,90 the
“presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in
[American] jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries
older than our Republic.”91 Whether viewed simply as a presumption
or a constitutional requirement, this general rule is supported by

87. Id. at 701–02.
88. Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2003),
vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2834 (2004); Garb v. Republic of Poland, 72 F. App’x 850 (2d
Cir. 2003), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004); Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir.
2003), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004); Whiteman v. Republic of Austria, 2002
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19984 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated and remanded, 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004).
89. Abrams v. Société’ Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir.
2004).
90. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
91. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994).
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92
several rationales. The dominant rationale is a sense of fairness that
drives courts to be cautious in applying laws that deprive citizens of
the “opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their
93
conduct accordingly.” The fear is that a retroactive statute disrupts
“settled expectations”94 when it “takes away or impairs vested rights
acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a
new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or
considerations already past.”95 Another rationale for the rule centers
on the Madisonian fear of legislatures using retroactive statutes to
benefit the powerful and punish unpopular groups or individuals in
society.96 Not all retroactive applications of statutes are impermissible,
however.
The Court in Landgraf set forth a two-prong test by which to
determine whether a statute should apply retroactively.97 Courts
should first examine whether the statute includes an express
98
statement that Congress intended the statute to apply retroactively.
If such an express statement is present, then the statute may apply
99
retroactively. In the absence of an express statement, courts need to
determine whether retroactive application of the statute would affect
“vested rights” or impose new obligations.100 If a statute does either,
then it is considered “substantive” in nature and retroactive
101
application of the statute would be impermissible under Landgraf.
In its Altmann decision, the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding,
that the FSIA does not include an express statement regarding its
retroactive application and ultimately held that the FSIA should
nonetheless apply retroactively because Austria could not have

92. Id. at 266 (noting several constitutional provisions that prohibit retroactive
application).
93. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265.
94. Id. at 266.
95. Id. at 269 (quoting Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756,
767 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156)).
96. Id. at 266, 267 n.20.
97. Id. at 280.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.; see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 694 (2004) (“Under
Landgraf, therefore, it is appropriate to ask whether the Act affects substantive rights . . . or
addresses only matters of procedure . . . .”).
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legitimately expected to receive immunity for its actions relating to
102
the Klimt paintings.
The Court in Altmann did not simply affirm the Ninth Circuit’s
judgment, but expressly—and properly—disagreed with its rote
103
application of the Landgraf test. In deciding not to apply the
Landgraf test to the FSIA, the Court visited two issues: (1) whether it
is even possible to categorize the FSIA as a procedural or substantive
statute, and (2) whether foreign states’ reliance interests have a place
in the immunity calculus.
1. A Definitional Dilemma: Is the FSIA Procedural or
Substantive? The Court’s discussion in Altmann regarding whether
the FSIA is procedural or substantive will likely have a lasting effect
on how lower courts decide other FSIA-related questions. Prior to
Altmann, lower courts struggled in determining whether the FSIA
should be viewed as a procedural statute or a substantive one. For
example, the FSIA could be viewed as procedural in the sense that it
contains “procedural provisions relating to venue, removal,
execution, and attachment apply[ing] to all pending cases”104 and, as
observed by one commentator, the FSIA
removed the existing federal jurisdictional bases for suits against
foreign sovereigns from a number of statutes, including [t]he Alien
Tort Statute, Diversity Jurisdiction, Admiralty Jurisdiction,
Interpleader, Commerce and Antitrust[,] and Patents, Copyrights
and Trademarks, and placed the exclusive basis for federal
105
jurisdiction over suits against foreign sovereigns in the FSIA.

In another sense, however, the FSIA could be viewed as substantive
in that it “does not merely concern access to the federal courts,” but
“governs the types of actions for which foreign sovereigns may be
held liable . . . in the United States . . . . [and] codifies the standards

102. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 964–67 (9th Cir. 2002).
103. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 692 (2004) (“[C]ontrary to the
assumption of the District Court and Court of Appeals, the default rule announced in our
opinion in Landgraf v. USI Film Products does not control the outcome in this case.” (citations
omitted)).
104. Id. at 698.
105. Michael D. Murray, Stolen Art and Sovereign Immunity: The Case of Altmann v.
Austria, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 301, 308 (2004) (citations omitted).
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governing foreign sovereign immunity as an aspect of substantive
106
federal law.”
Altmann, however, concluded that “the FSIA defies such
107
and found Landgraf’s procedural-substantive
categorization”
distinction too crude an instrument to determine whether the FSIA
should apply retroactively. First, as the Court noted, the traditional
presumption against retroactivity has its greatest analytical value
when applied to private rights, which are rights tethered to reliance
interests.108 The problem, as explained further in Section A.2, is that,
although having a “reasonable expectation” of immunity, foreign
states never had a “right” to such immunity.109 Second, Landgraf’s
retroactivity analysis is inadequate in determining whether the FSIA
is impermissibly retroactive because, even if the FSIA creates
jurisdiction where there was none before,110 and thus is substantive,
this “characteristic,” as the Court noted, “is in some tension with
111
other, less substantive aspects” of the FSIA.
A primary purpose of the FSIA as a jurisdiction-allocating
statute was to remove the case-by-case determinations that were
being performed by the State Department. These changes did not
deprive foreign states of “settled expectations” from suit, and thus
affect substantive rights, but rather clarified the terms under which
112
immunity would or would not be granted. The Court declared that

106. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 496–97 (1983) (emphasis added).
107. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 694.
108. Id. at 696.
109. See infra Part III.A.2 for an explanation why the Court properly affirmed the principle
that sovereign immunity is rooted in comity rather than in the Constitution).
110. This was an argument raised by the Republic of Austria, Reply Brief of Republic of
Austria at 5, Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (No. 03-13), 2004 WL 114700, at *5, and endorsed by the
dissent, see Altmann, 541 U.S. at 723 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (conceding that the FSIA is
jurisdictional in nature, but also arguing that it has an impermissible retroactive effect because it
“create[s] jurisdiction where there was none before”).
111. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 696 n.15.
112. As one commentator has noted, prior to the FSIA’s enactment, “[r]ecommendations of
the State Department were not consistently made—sometimes a negative recommendation was
made . . . [and a] favorable suggestion of immunity depended on the good will and good
relations between the United States and the foreign sovereign at the time of the suit.” Michael
D. Murray, Jurisdiction Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for Nazi War Crimes of
Plunder and Expropriation, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 223, 271 (2004). Thus, the FSIA’s
codification of restrictive sovereign immunity did not “divest foreign states of settled
expectations,” but rather “clarified unsettled and uncertain expectations as to whether the state
of relations between the foreign state and the United States at the time of suit [was favorable].”
Id. at 279.
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the FSIA was neither solely procedural in nature nor solely
substantive, despite a prior pronouncement that statutes, “even
[when] phrased in ‘jurisdictional’ terms, [are] as much subject to our
113
presumption against retroactivity as any other.” In highlighting the
seemingly procedural and substantive aspects of the FSIA, the
Court’s opinion offers lowers courts an important explanation as to
why the FSIA merits a different inquiry than the one put forth in
Landgraf.
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A Right Based in Comity, Not
the Constitution. Both commentators114 and courts115 have frequently
argued, almost reflexively, that foreign states have expectations of
immunity. This is understandable for a number of reasons. First, the
Supreme Court, in addition to its general hesitancy to expand federal
court jurisdiction, has indicated that prior to 1952 foreign states did
have an expectation of sovereign immunity. Second, the United
States—acting through the State Department—has repeatedly
observed that foreign states do rely on immunity. There is a general
understanding within the international community that provisions of
the FSIA should not have retroactive effect, particularly given that
the United States has entered into many agreements with foreign
nations “against the background assumption that [they will not] be
sued in United States courts.”116
These reasons are, of course, understandable, and Altmann
certainly did not give them short shrift. The only problem is that,
when extended too far, they lead ultimately to a faulty conclusion:
that foreign states have a “right” to immunity from suit. No such right

113. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 951 (1977)
(emphases omitted).
114. See, e.g., Adam K.A. Mortara, The Case Against Retroactive Application of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 253, 267 (2001) (“The FSIA also abridges
what is arguably an antecedent right: that of sovereign immunity.”).
115. See, e.g., Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d
Cir. 1988) (“We believe, as did the district court, that ‘[o]nly after 1952 was it reasonable for a
foreign sovereign to anticipate being sued in the United States courts on commercial
transactions.’” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)); Jackson v. People’s Republic of
China, 794 F.2d 1490, 1497–98 (11th Cir. 1986) (“We agree that to give the Act retrospective
application to pre-1952 events would interfere with antecedent rights of other sovereigns . . . .”).
116. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 17–18, Altmann,
541 U.S. 677 (No. 03-13); see also ALLAN GERSON & JERRY ADLER, THE PRICE OF TERROR
152 (2001) (providing an interesting discussion of the State Department’s unwavering
institutional commitment to preserving the full scope of sovereign immunity).
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exists. Foreign sovereign immunity has always been rooted in comity,
117
not in the Constitution. In rejecting the Landgraf inquiry, the Court
properly clarified for lower courts how the principles of sovereign
immunity informed its decision that the FSIA was meant by Congress
to be applied retroactively.
Beginning with The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court has
made clear that sovereign immunity is a privilege extended by one
sovereign to another simply in the spirit of comity, and always
118
capable of being withdrawn. Sovereign immunity differs from other
status-based rights to immunity. Whereas legislative immunity,
judicial immunity, and presidential immunity have been designed to
shield legislators, judges, and the executive from the chilling effects
that litigation can have on their duties,119 sovereign immunity is not
designed to protect the duties or expectations of foreign states.
Rather, its function is only ‘‘to give foreign states and their
instrumentalities some protection from the inconvenience of suit as a
gesture of comity between the United States and other sovereigns.’’120
B. Post-Altmann Sovereign Immunity Determinations: Revival of
Executive Suggestion?
In holding in Altmann that the FSIA was meant to apply in all
cases, the Court sought to convey the important message that
retroactive application of the FSIA was consistent with and in
furtherance of one of its primary goals—to remove political
considerations from the immunity calculus. Unfortunately, the Court
did not stop there. Although in one breath it expressly rejected the
historical inquiry that the Ninth Circuit and other courts had used to
determine how a foreign state would have been treated by the State
Department at the time of the conduct in question, in the next it

117. See The Schooner Exch. v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 137 (1812) (“[A]ll
sovereigns have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar
circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within their respective territories
which sovereignty confers.”).
118. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983).
119. See, e.g., Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003) (noting that “[t]he
immunities for government officers prevent the threat of suit from ‘crippling the proper and
effective administration of public affairs’” (citations omitted)).
120. Id. See also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 696 (2004) (“[T]he principal
purpose of foreign sovereign immunity has never been to permit foreign states and their
instrumentalities to shape their conduct in reliance on the promise of future immunity from suit
in United States courts.”).
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invited the State Department to resume its practice of filing
suggestions of immunity in FSIA cases. Nothing in the opinion
expressly invited the State Department to make such filings; the
Court simply noted that “nothing in [its] holding prevents the State
121
Department from filing statements of interest.” The implication,
however, is that courts may, just as they did prior to the “Tate
Letter,” defer to the judgment of the State Department regarding
foreign states’ immunity. Such intervention by the executive branch
raises serious separation-of-powers concerns and diminishes the
overall clarity that Altmann has otherwise provided.122
A driving force behind enactment of the FSIA was a need to
relieve the executive branch from the obligation to take a position in
123
politically sensitive sovereign immunity determinations. Altmann’s
announcement that the State Department may file suggestions of
immunity represented a departure from the very purpose of the
FSIA. It placed courts in a “middle position”124 between choosing to
apply the “neutral principles”125 set forth in the FSIA and choosing to
invite the State Department to file statements of interest in immunity
determinations. In so doing, the Court raised a serious separation-ofpowers question: can the foreign affairs power of the executive
126
supersede a statutory scheme set forth by Congress? The Court’s
revival of executive suggestion may also complicate foreign policy.127
With Altmann’s endorsement of executive suggestion, foreign states
facing jurisdiction in American courts are likely to resume lobbying
the State Department to file suggestions of immunity—precisely the
activity Congress sought to eliminate in enacting the FSIA.

121. Id. at 701.
122. The majority’s discussion of the use of the State Department’s views in sovereign
immunity determinations was also criticized as being extraneous to the only question presented:
whether provisions of the FSIA should be applied retroactively. Id. at 734 (Kennedy, J.
dissenting).
123. See supra Part I.B.
124. See Leading Case, 118 HARV. L. REV. 466, 474 (2004) (discussing how the Court
adopted a “middle position” that raised a “fundamental separation-of-powers question at the
root of the tension between sovereign immunity principles and practice”).
125. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 702 n.23.
126. Id. at 734 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 715 (“[T]he ultimate effect of the Court’s inviting foreign nations to pressure
the Executive is to risk inconsistent results for private citizens who sue, based on changes and
nuances in foreign affairs, and to add prospective instability to the most sensitive area of foreign
relations.”).
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Most disturbingly, as both the dissent in Altmann and several
commentators have demonstrated, a powerful criticism of the Court’s
injection of executive suggestions into the immunity calculus is that
such suggestions will lead to a patchwork of conflicting approaches in
the lower courts as judges struggle to balance the neutral principles of
the FSIA with competing political pressures from the State
Department. The Court’s refusal to explain the extent to which a
court should defer to a suggestion of immunity leaves important
questions unresolved and may “set in motion the gears to generate a
case . . . in which the neutral principles of the FSIA authorized
jurisdiction, but the State Department filed a politically based
suggestion for immunity ‘which, by its insistence, superseded the
128
statute’s directive.’”
IV. ASSESSING THE DAMAGE: WHAT DOES
RETROACTIVE APPLICATION REALLY MEAN FOR PLAINTIFFS,
FOREIGN STATES, AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT?
The Supreme Court’s decision in Altmann to apply the FSIA to
all claims against foreign governments, regardless of when the
underlying facts occurred, represents a significant development in
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Besides questions as to how this
decision comports with retroactivity principles or the doctrine of
sovereign immunity, a more practical question naturally emerges:
what does Altmann mean for plaintiffs, foreign states, and the State
Department?
A. For Plaintiffs, a “Positive,” but Measured, Development
When the Court ruled last term that Maria Altmann’s suit could
proceed, there was a flood of news coverage discussing how the
decision would bring other Holocaust-era suits against foreign
governments to U.S. courts.129 Whether many of these claims will
prove to be viable is a different question.

128.
129.

Leading Case, supra note 124, at 474 (citations omitted).
See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Allow Suit Against Austria to Regain Art, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2004, at A20 (“[T]he decision may open the door to additional World War II-era
lawsuits, but the category of cases the decision will actually assist is likely to be small.”); Henry
Weinstein, Woman Can Sue Austria Over Art Seized by Nazis: Supreme Court Ruling May
Encourage Others to Go After Governments for Disputed Property, L.A. TIMES, June 8, 2004, at
A1 (“Altmann’s victory may open courtrooms for other Holocaust survivors and heirs of people
who perished.”).
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The filing of suits against foreign governments for Holocaust-era
expropriations and wrongs has been hailed as a “positive
development,” a testament to the strength of the U.S. legal system
and an important, potentially final opportunity for elderly survivors
130
to seek redress when all other options have proved impossible.
Some commentators have viewed the issues raised in Altmann within
131
the wider context of human rights litigation. For example, one
commentator said the Court’s decision to uphold federal court
jurisdiction over Austria constituted “judicial affirmation” of the
principles set forth at the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era
Assets.132 Another commentator noted that the Ninth Circuit’s review
of Maria Altmann’s case was saturated with moral and emotional
133
overtones, with the court phrasing its central question as “whether
Austria would have been entitled to immunity for its alleged
complicity in the pillaging and retention of treasured paintings from
the home of a Jewish alien who was forced to flee for his life.”134
Indeed, even Maria Altmann argued that the Supreme Court must
consider the issue of the FSIA’s retroactivity in her case against a
“historical backdrop” in which the United States made clear to
Austria that Nazi-looted artwork should be returned to its rightful

130. See, e.g., BAZYLER, supra note 2, at xii–xiii (discussing the unique aspects of
American legal culture that have made it possible for Holocaust-era claims to be heard).
131. See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, The ‘Last Prisoners of War’: Unrestituted Nazi-Looted Art, 6
U.S.F. J.L. & SOC. CHALLENGES 81, 95 (2004) (arguing that Altmann speaks to “the ability of
American courts to make a valuable contribution in achieving Holocaust-era justice”); Andrzej
R. Niekrasz, Comment, The Past is Another Country: Against the Retroactive Applicability of the
Foreign Immunities Act to Pre-1952 Conduct, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2004) (“The
issue of the retroactive applicability of the FSIA is clearly controversial in this age of importing
global human rights litigation to the American civil justice system.”); Svetlana Shirinova,
Comment, Challenges to Establishing Jurisdiction Over Holocaust Era Claims in Federal Court,
34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 159, 190 (2004) (“Resolving [Altmann’s and] the remaining
Holocaust Era cases will demonstrate to the world that the United States is still devoted to
fighting genocide and will not tolerate injustice.”).
132. Yonover, supra note 131, at 95. The “Washington Principles,” as they are known, were
agreed to by forty-five nations and a number of nongovernmental organizations at a conference
sponsored by the State Department in 1998. Although the principles are nonbinding, signatory
nations (which include Austria) have agreed, among other things, to identify Nazi-confiscated
artworks that have not been restituted and to develop alternative dispute-resolution
mechanisms for resolving ownership questions. U.S. State Dep’t, Washington Conference
Principles on Nazi-Confiscated Art (Dec. 3, 1998), http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/23231.htm.
133. Shirinova, supra note 131, at 183–84.
134. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 964 (9th Cir. 2003).
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135
owners. The Altmann case and similar cases against foreign states
are, understandably, rooted in hopes that elderly Holocaust survivors
will finally have their day in court.
Although Altmann does represent a significant development in
sovereign immunity jurisprudence and removes a hurdle for plaintiffs
bringing suits based on pre-1952 events, it is important to recall the
narrowness of the Court’s holding.136 The Court never decided
whether the particular exception at issue, expropriation under §
137
1605(a)(3), was properly raised by the facts. The Court also did not
decide whether Austria could successfully invoke substantive
defenses to Altmann’s claim.138 And by almost every account,
Altmann’s case presented a very unusual set of facts, a point
139
recognized even by Altmann herself. No executive agreement or
treaty between Austria and the United States discernibly conflicted
140
with federal court jurisdiction. Also, Altmann did try to sue in
Austria, but the two million dollar filing fee was prohibitive.141 Austria
also had a thirty-day statute of limitations period, which would have
142
effectively barred her suit. When the suit was brought in the United
States, Altmann’s attorney expressed willingness to return to an
Austrian court if Austria would agree to drop the statute of
limitations defense, which Austria refused to do.143 It was only

135. See Brief for Respondent at 6–8, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004)
(No. 03-13) (detailing various pronouncements by the United States that served to put the
Republic of Austria on notice that individual claims could be made for Nazi-looted property).
136. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700.
137. Id. Indeed, the plaintiffs’ biggest hurdle on remand may very well be presenting facts
that satisfy one of the enumerated exceptions to the FSIA. Altmann addressed only the issue of
the FSIA’s retroactive application. It did not alter the stringency with which courts would assess
whether facts support application of one of the FSIA’s exceptions to immunity. Even Judge
Wald, whose persuasive dissent in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C.
Cir. 1994), argued that the FSIA should be interpreted to include an implied waiver exception
for jus cogens violations, recognized that the particular exception at issue, § 1605(a)(1), would
still have to be interpreted narrowly to avoid judicial interference with matters involving
sensitive foreign relations. Id. at 1184–85 (Wald, J., dissenting).
138. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 700–01.
139. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 43 (“This case presents a complex
combination of somewhat unique facts and legal issues that is sui generis and not likely to be
repeated in other cases.”).
140. Id. at 41.
141. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 245.
142. Id. at 247.
143. Id. at 247–48.
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because of Austria’s excessive filing fee and difficult statute of
144
limitations that Altmann brought suit in the United States.
In addition to the narrowness of the Altmann decision and the
unique factual circumstances involved, the Court’s analytical
approach is significant because it illustrates the purely jurisdictional
nature of the FSIA and the dispassionate analysis that should
145
accompany immunity determinations. By holding that the FSIA’s
sovereign immunity rules should be applied in all cases, regardless of
when the underlying conduct occurred, the Court’s primary aim was
not to send a social message but rather to offer lower courts clear
instructions regarding how such immunity determinations should be
made.
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in the Altmann case focused on
whether Austria could have reasonably expected to receive
146
immunity. In so doing, the court precisely endorsed the approach
used by the dissent in Princz v. Federal Republic of Germany,147 in
which Judge Wald of the D.C. Circuit, after reviewing the outcome of
the Nuremberg trial, concluded that “[i]n the mid-1940s, Germany
could not, even in its wildest dreams, have expected the executive
branch of the United States, as a matter of grace and comity, to
suggest immunity for its enslavement and confinement (in three
concentration camps) of an American citizen during the
Holocaust.”148 This kind of “historical inquiry” into foreign-states’
expectations of immunity was expressly rejected by the Supreme
Court in Altmann.149
Altmann, although generally a positive development for
plaintiffs, was not intended to encourage human rights litigation in
federal courts. Rather, the case is significant for the clear instruction
it has provided to lower courts: apply the FSIA’s provisions to all

144. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 6 (“Indeed, it was only because of an
oppressive filing fee requirement ($2 million) and a more difficult (although, according to
Austria, not insurmountable) statute of limitations standard that Mrs. Altmann did not bring
her suit in Austria.” (citation omitted)).
145. Even Altmann’s attorney recognized that the question of whether the FSIA could be
applied retroactively was one that could be decided “through a dispassionate analysis of the
statute in question, [the] Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence and the legal relationship between
the parties to this case.” Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 2.
146. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir. 2003).
147. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
148. Id. at 1179 (Wald, J., dissenting).
149. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004).
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cases regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred. A recent
post-Altmann case, Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer
150
Francais, did exactly this; it exhibits how Altmann is not necessarily
a windfall for plaintiffs.
Abrams involved a suit by Holocaust survivors and their heirs
against a French national railroad company that was alleged to have
committed crimes against humanity and violated customary
international law by transporting thousands of French Jews to slave
151
labor camps. At the time of these acts, the railroad company was
privately owned, but it had been acquired in whole by the French
government in 1983.152 The plaintiffs brought a number of claims and,
153
invoking international law and the Alien Tort Claims Act, sought
154
jurisdiction in a U.S. federal district court. Unlike many other
FSIA-related cases, it was the plaintiffs arguing that the FSIA could
not be applied retroactively and that the French national railroad
company was, thus, not immune because it was privately owned at the
time of the Holocaust.155 The District Court for the Eastern District of
New York disagreed, holding that the FSIA does apply to pre-1952
events and that the French national railroad company was immune
because it was now a wholly owned instrumentality156 of the state.157
Although the Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the
railroad was an instrumentality of France, it vacated the dismissal and
remanded the case because there was insufficient information as to
how the State Department, during World War II, would have
assessed the significance of the railroad’s corporate form in an
immunity determination.158 This information, the Second Circuit
reasoned, was significant in determining whether the State
Department would have recognized immunity in such a case as the
150. 389 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 2004).
151. Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423, 425
(E.D.N.Y. 2001).
152. Id.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
154. Abrams, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 433.
155. Id. at 426.
156. The FSIA applies to any “instrumentality” or “agency” of a foreign state that is a
separate legal entity and is an organ or political subdivision of a foreign state, or when a
majority of its shares or other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or one of its
political subdivisions. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (2000).
157. Id. at 450.
158. Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 332 F.3d 173, 188 (2d Cir.
2003).
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plaintiffs’ and whether the plaintiffs’ expectation that they could
litigate their claim against the railroad in the United States was
159
legitimate.
The Supreme Court vacated the Second Circuit’s decision and
remanded the case to be considered in light of its holding in
Altmann.160 In late 2004, on remand, the Second Circuit dismissed the
plaintiffs’ suit.161 Following the rule articulated by the Court in Dole
Food Co. v. Patrickson,162 which held that an entity’s status as an
instrumentality of the state is determined at the time the suit is filed
163
and not when the conduct occurred, the Second Circuit ruled that
the French national railroad was, indeed, an instrumentality of France
164
at the time the complaint was filed and, thus, was immune from suit.
Whether the railroad would have been treated as a corporate entity
or government entity during the war, the Second Circuit said that this
was now irrelevant under Altmann and that it was unnecessary to
inquire into the State Department’s views.165
Interestingly, the Second Circuit concluded its analysis by noting
that it was
bound by [Altmann] to defer to comity rather than to approach the
situation from the perspective of the injured plaintiffs whose rights
have now been altered. Accordingly, the evil actions of the French
national railroad’s former private masters in knowingly transporting
thousands to death camps during World War II are not susceptible
to legal redress in federal court today, because defendant has since
become a part of the French government and is therefore
immunized from suit by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
166
Nonetheless, the railroad’s conduct at the time lives on in infamy.

As this language suggests, Altmann advanced dispassion and clarity
over redress of past wrongs. Moreover, it effectively addressed critics’
arguments that immunity determinations were being made out of a
“judicial impulse toward plaintiff-oriented equity,” “judicial

159.
160.
161.
2004).
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais v. Abrams, 124 S. Ct. 2834, 2834 (2004).
Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61, 64–65 (2d Cir.
538 U.S. 468 (2003).
Id. at 478.
Abrams, 389 F.3d at 64–65.
Id.
Id. at 64–65.
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activism,” and “judicial creativity in refusing to dismiss World War
167
Although Altmann may be a significant
II–related actions.”
development for plaintiffs, retroactive application of the FSIA can
also cut both ways, as Abrams shows.
B. For Foreign States, a Serious Setback?
When the district court denied Austria’s motion to dismiss Maria
Altmann’s suit, the “effect was that for the first time in the United
States a foreign country was being forced to go to trial in an
American court on a claim alleging failure to return to its proper
owners a Nazi-stolen artwork.”168 Naturally, foreign states saw the
Supreme Court’s decision in Altmann as important because it
represented a significant shift in American foreign sovereign
immunity jurisprudence and, potentially, “open[ed] the floodgates”
for more litigation against foreign states relating to Holocaust-era
wrongs.169 Indeed, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, Mexico, in
its amicus brief, declared that its “interest in the proper resolution of
this case [was] not theoretical,” noting that it had been sued in recent
years in American courts and that, after the Ninth Circuit’s decision
in Altmann, it had been “forced to relitigate the issue of its immunity
for pre-1952 events under the amorphous retroactivity standard that
the Ninth Circuit adopted.”170
171
Despite this parade of horribles, foreign states’ fears should be
allayed for several reasons. Specifically, the unique facts underlying
Altmann’s claims; the Court’s explicit rejection of the Ninth Circuit’s
172
“unmanageable” case-by-case historical inquiry into whether a
foreign state would have been accorded immunity at a particular

167. Niekrasz, supra note 131, at 1338, 1353–1354. One view is that courts were failing to
properly apply the FSIA by keeping World War II–related cases in federal courts because of the
morally and politically sensitive nature of such claims. Id.
168. BAZYLER, supra note 2, at 246.
169. Murray, supra note 105, at 319 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 42–46, Republic of Austria
v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-13)); Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 42–43.
170. Brief for Mexico as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 12, at *1 (citing
Cruz v. United States, Nos. C-02-1942-CRB, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10948, at *10–11 (N.D. Cal.
June 20, 2003).
171. Murray, supra note 105, at 319 (citing Brief for Petitioner, supra note 169, at 42–46);
Brief for Respondent, supra note 135, at 44.
172. This is how Austria characterized the outcome for other immunity determinations if
the district court’s decision to exercise jurisdiction over Austria was affirmed. Brief for
Petitioner, supra note 169, at 42–46.
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time; and the range of defenses under the FSIA that are unaffected
by the Court’s holding in Altmann—including the act-of-state,
political question, and forum non conveniens doctrines—all indicate
that foreign states need not be concerned that Altmann will greatly
expand their liability. This Section reviews three important defenses,
arguing that Altmann does not represent as big a setback as some
foreign states have argued.
173
One option, as the Court in Altmann explicitly mentioned, is
that a foreign state may still invoke a substantive defense that its
actions fall under the act-of-state doctrine and, therefore, that the
legality of its public domestic acts cannot be questioned in a foreign
court. This doctrine reflects a recognition that “juridical review of
acts of state of a foreign power could embarrass the conduct of
foreign relations by the political branches of the government.”174 In
175
Underhill v. Hernandez, the Court provided the classic formulation
of this doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
176
powers as between themselves.

Like the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the act-of-state doctrine
derives “from the thoroughly sound principle that on occasion
individual litigants may have to forgo decision on the merits of their
claims because the involvement of the courts in such a decision might
frustrate the conduct of the Nation’s foreign policy.”177 Unlike the

173. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 700 (2004) (“Unlike a claim of sovereign
immunity, which merely raises a jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides foreign
states with a substantive defense on the merits. Under that doctrine, the courts of one state will
not question the validity of public acts (acts jure imperii) performed by other sovereigns within
their own borders, even when such courts have jurisdiction over a controversy in which one of
the litigants has standing to challenge those acts”).
174. First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765 (1972).
175. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
176. Id. at 252.
177. First Nat’l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 769. The Ninth Circuit, in International Ass’n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cogently summarized
the separation of powers and judicial economy concerns raised by suits against foreign states:
The doctrine recognizes the institutional limitations of the courts and the peculiar
requirements of successful foreign relations. To participate adeptly in the global
community, the United States must speak with one voice and pursue a careful and
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doctrine of sovereign immunity, however, the act-of-state doctrine is a
178
“rule of decision.” It is prudential rather than jurisdictional,
meaning that federal courts enjoy considerable flexibility in
determining whether to defer, for reasons such as comity, to the
executive branch’s assessment of when application of the doctrine
would advance the interests of the United States.179 Despite this
important distinction between the two doctrines, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity as codified in the FSIA “in no way affects
existing law on the extent to which, if at all, the ‘act of state’ doctrine
may be applicable”—a point stressed by the Court most recently in
Altmann.180 For Austria, this pronouncement means that it likely can
assert title to the Klimt paintings because the nationalization or
expropriation constituted a public act (jure imperii) that U.S. courts
may not review, because the act-of-state doctrine “precludes [U.S.]
courts . . . from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a
recognized foreign sovereign power committed within its own
territory.”181 For other foreign states, the significance is that the Court

deliberate foreign policy. The political branches of our government are able to
consider the competing economic and political considerations and respond to the
public will in order to carry on foreign relations in accordance with the best interests
of the country as a whole. The courts, in contrast, focus on single disputes and make
decisions on the basis of legal principles. The timing of our decisions is largely a result
of our caseload and of the random tactical considerations which motivate parties to
bring lawsuits and to seek delay or expedition. When the courts engage in piecemeal
adjudication of the legality of the sovereign acts of states, they risk disruption of our
country’s international diplomacy. The executive may utilize protocol, economic
sanction, compromise, delay, and persuasion to achieve international objectives. Illtimed judicial decisions challenging the acts of foreign states could nullify these tools
and embarrass the United States in the eyes of the world.
Id. at 1358.
178. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).
179. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421–23, 438 (1964); see also First
Nat’l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768 (“We conclude that where the Executive Branch, charged as it
is with primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, expressly represents to the
Court that application of the act-of-state doctrine would not advance the interests of American
foreign policy, that doctrine should not be applied by the courts.”); Bernstein v. N.V.
Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375, 375–76 (2d Cir. 1954) (noting the State
Department’s policy of “reliev[ing] American courts from any restraint upon the exercise of
their jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the acts of Nazi officials”).
180. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 713 (2004) (internal citations omitted);
see also Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 649 F.2d at 1359 (rejecting the view that the act-of-state
doctrine has been superceded by the FSIA and noting that Congress, in enacting the FSIA,
recognized the distinction between that statute and the doctrine and “found it unnecessary to
address” how the FSIA affected the act-of-state doctrine) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 20
n.1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6619 n.1)).
181. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 41. But see Yonover, supra note 131, at 92 (arguing that the actof-state doctrine would not even apply in this case because the doctrine “applies only when the
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has left untouched a substantive defense that, despite various
182
restrictions imposed by Congress and the Court, is an effective basis
for dismissing suits involving foreign states, particularly when the
183
State Department cautions a court against proceeding.
Additionally, the FSIA does not preclude a foreign state from
moving for dismissal on the ground that a case presents a
nonjusticiable political question. The purpose of the political question
doctrine is to avoid review of cases that are simply too “political” and
that are most appropriately resolved by the legislative and executive
184
branches. Like the act-of-state doctrine, its applicability is without
clear definition. In the seminal case of Baker v. Carr, the Court noted
several characteristics of a nonjusticiable political question, with
dismissal appropriate when any one of these is “inextricable from the
case at bar.”185 On occasion, courts have invoked one or more of the

foreign government involved is still ‘extant and recognized by’ the United States at the time of
the lawsuit” and, given that the Nazis annexed Austria in 1938, “a court could conclude that
Austria was not the sovereign acting at the time of the taking of the property and, more
importantly, the Nazi regime that looted the property no longer exists” (citation omitted)). The
success of an act-of-state defense by Austria would of course depend on whether the State
Department counsels for application of the doctrine. See First Nat’l City Bank, 406 U.S. at 768.
Austria’s defense under this doctrine would also be precluded if its acts with respect to the
Klimt paintings were found to be commercial in nature. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 706 (1976) (refusing to extend the act-of-state doctrine to a
foreign nation’s commercial activities).
182. See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 706 (emphasizing that the act-of-state
doctrine does not apply to the commercial activities of a foreign government); First Nat’l City
Bank, 406 U.S. at 770 (stating that the act-of-state doctrine should not be applied against the
wishes of the executive branch); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 374
(4th ed. 2003) (noting certain circumstances, under 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e), in which courts may not
decline judicial review on the basis of the act-of-state doctrine).
183. Although the State Department did not recommend against the district court’s
adjudication of the dispute in W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493
U.S. 400 (1990), the Third Circuit’s decision in that case is an illustration of how federal courts,
although not bound by the State Department’s legal opinions, nonetheless give “substantial
respect” to its concerns in determining how a civil suit involving a foreign state should proceed.
Envtl. Tectonics Corp. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 847 F.2d 1052, 1062 (3d Cir. 1988).
184. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). Not every case that “touches [upon] foreign
relations lies beyond judicial cognizance,” however, given that the justiciability inquiry is limited
to “‘political questions,’ not . . . ‘political cases.’” Id. at 211, 217.
185. Id. at 217. The factors Baker listed as characteristics of a political question are the
following: (1) a “textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department,” (2) a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it,” (3) the “impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion,” (4) the “impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government,” (5)
an “unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made,” or (6) the
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Baker factors in dismissing suits in the area of foreign affairs, with the
rationale mostly centering on lack of expertise or fear of interfering
with the political branches. When courts are faced with suits brought
against foreign states, they frequently dismiss them as nonjusticiable
political questions, particularly if the cases involve statements of
interest from the executive.186 In Altmann, the State Department filed
no such statement; one can only speculate as to whether the district
court would have dismissed the case as invoking a political question if
it had. For foreign states fearing enhanced exposure to liability in
American courts in the wake of Altmann, the cases since the Supreme
Court’s decision that have been dismissed as involving political
questions demonstrate that the political question doctrine remains a
187
potent defense for foreign states.
Finally, foreign states may still move to dismiss suits brought
under the FSIA on a forum non conveniens ground. This doctrine
allows federal courts to decline jurisdiction if bringing suit in another
forum would be more convenient for the parties and would better
188
advance the interest of justice. Factors relevant to a court’s
determination whether to dismiss a case under forum non conveniens
include the availability of an adequate alternative forum; “private
interest” factors, such as the litigant’s relative ease of access to
evidence, availability of process to compel attendance, and the cost of

“potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.” Id.
186. See, e.g., Third Ave. Assocs. v. Consulate Gen. of Socialist Fed. Republic of Yugo., 218
F.3d 152, 157, 164 (2d Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the executive that a dispute concerning
successor states to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia involved nonjusticiable political
questions); Anderman v. Federal Republic of Austria, 256 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1113–14 (C.D. Cal.
2003) (finding that a class action suit against Austria was inextricable from at least four of the
Baker factors and agreeing with the executive that retaining jurisdiction over the suit would
interfere with an executive agreement between Austria and the United States); Joo v. Japan,
172 F. Supp. 2d 52, 66–67 (D.D.C. 2001) (finding that “to some extent each of the factors
identified in Baker [was] inextricable from the present case” and agreeing with the executive
that there was a political question in light of treaties and agreements negotiated with Japan after
World War II).
187. See Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal of a complaint as
presenting a nonjusticiable political question); Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 562 (9th
Cir. 2005) (affirming dismissal under the political question doctrine of certain claims by
Holocaust survivors alleging human rights violations based on the Vatican Bank’s alleged
assistance to the Croatian Ustasha political regime); Gross v. German Found. Indus. Initiative,
320 F. Supp. 2d 235, 235 (D.N.J. 2004) (ruling that the political question doctrine necessitated
dismissal of a suit against a German-instrumentality foundation and German corporations for
their complicity in exploiting the plaintiffs as slave laborers during the Holocaust). ‘
188. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507 (1947).
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obtaining attendance of witnesses; and “public factors,” such as court
congestion, the local interest in the litigation, the avoidance of
conflict-of-law problems, and the unfairness of burdening a jury in an
189
unrelated forum. Dismissal of suits against foreign states under
forum non conveniens is common and, as one commentator notes,
advisable to avoid risks of jurisdictional and diplomatic friction and to
190
decrease the potential for unenforceable judgments.
These common defenses limit federal jurisdiction over suits
against foreign states and suggest that, even with Altmann’s
endorsement of the FSIA’s retroactive applicability, foreign states are
unlikely to be exposed to a significantly greater number of suits.
C. For the State Department, Deep Concerns
As Part III.B highlighted, there are serious concerns that
Altmann’s extension of the FSIA to pre-1952 conduct and, in
particular, its implicit invitation to the State Department to file
suggestions of immunity, may complicate American foreign policy in
three key ways. First, the State Department considers Holocaust-era
suits against foreign governments as upsetting the various legislative
and diplomatic arrangements that the United States has made with
other nations to provide restitution or compensation schemes.191
Second, the State Department fears that Altmann might encourage
foreign states to pass “mirror-image laws,” subjecting the United
States to increased foreign jurisdiction.192 As explained earlier, there
are a number of reasons, including the fact-specific narrowness of the
Altmann holding and the range of defenses that remain available to
foreign states, which suggest that these fears are probably overblown.
The third major concern of the State Department is more
troubling. Altmann’s apparent reference to the State Department’s
ability to file suggestions of immunity may lead to a spate of lobbying

189. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6, 255 n.22 (1981); Gilbert, 330 U.S. at
508–09.
190. Jennifer M. Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the International
Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 239, 277
(2004).
191. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 28, Republic of
Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004) (No. 03-13), 2003 WL 22811828, at *28.
192. Id. at *29; see also Weinstein, supra note 129, at A1 (reporting the concern of Stuart E.
Eizenstat, former U.S. deputy treasury secretary, that Altmann “might prompt other countries
‘to pass mirror-image laws’ that allow their citizens to sue the U.S. government for alleged
wrongdoing”).
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by foreign states seeking dismissal of claims, putting the United States
193
government in an awkward position. As argued earlier, the Court’s
reference to suggestions of immunity distracts from the clarity that
Altmann has otherwise provided. Indeed, this reference was “wholly
unnecessary” given the other measures available to courts (for
example, the act-of-state and political question doctrines) and likely
“adds very little (if anything) to the Executive’s ability to influence
the dismissal of cases involving foreign sovereigns.”194 The State
Department, in light of Altmann, may very well choose not to file any
suggestions of immunity so as to discourage lobbying efforts by
foreign states. This would be consistent with the State Department’s
pre-Altmann policy of not filing suggestions of immunity on behalf of
foreign states, which has been in effect since the FSIA’s enactment in
1976.195 Thus, although Altmann appears to have implicitly
resurrected suggestions of immunity, they will probably appear only
rarely in practice.
Nonetheless, the Court’s reference to suggestions of immunity is
unfortunate. Although the Second Circuit did not find it as troubling
196
as many commentators have, the Ninth Circuit did. In Alperin v.
197
Vatican Bank, the Ninth Circuit struggled to determine how it
should interpret those instances in which the State Department
remains silent in a particular dispute since, after Altmann, courts are
permitted to give deference to the “considered judgment of the
198
Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.” The court
lamented that
[i]t is unclear . . . how courts should construe executive silence. We
are not mind readers. And, thus, we cannot discern whether the

193. Owen Paul & Karen Asner, The Long Arm of the Law, LEGAL WK., July 15, 2004,
http://www.legalweek.com/ViewItem.asp?id=20659&Keyword=owen.
194. Leading Case, supra note 124, at 475–76.
195. See 75 DEP’T ST. BULL. 649, 649 (1976) (“The Department of State will not make any
sovereign immunity determinations after the effective date of [the FSIA]. Indeed, it would be
inconsistent with the legislative intent of that Act for the Executive Branch to file any
suggestion of immunity on or after January 19, 1977.”).
196. See Abrams v. Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais, 389 F.3d 61, 63–64 (2d.
Cir. 2004) (noting that Altmann’s sanctioning of State Department involvement is limited to
only certain circumstances, such as “when a court has subject matter jurisdiction and yet there is
still strong executive interest in granting immunity or there is an ambiguity regarding an FSIA
exception”).
197. 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005).
198. Id. at 556 (quoting Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004)).
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State Department’s decision not to intervene is an implicit
199
endorsement, an objection, or simple indifference.

The Supreme Court could, and should, resolve the confusion it has
created by elaborating further upon the specific—and rare—
circumstances in which the State Department may intervene with a
suggestion of immunity. The Court should also thoroughly explain the
level of deference that courts should afford to such suggestions and
offer guidance to lower courts trying to make sense of those situations
in which the State Department provides only silence.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann
to apply the FSIA to all claims against foreign states, regardless of
when the events giving rise to the claim occurred, represents a
significant development in sovereign immunity jurisprudence. The
Court’s thorough treatment of the FSIA, in light of retroactivity and
sovereign immunity principles, will likely provide lower courts with
much-needed clarity in future immunity determinations. Although
Altmann may be viewed as a blessing for plaintiffs and a burden for
foreign states, this Note has attempted to show how Altmann’s
interpretation of the FSIA will likely produce less dramatic results
than some have expected. Given that the decision brought clarity to
the question of the FSIA’s retroactive application, however, the
Court’s invitation to the State Department to issue suggestions of
immunity is disappointing. Although in practice these suggestions of
immunity are likely to be rare, the Court should consider clarifying
the precise circumstances in which these suggestions might be made
and the level of deference, if any, that courts should give them.

199.

Id.

